Trust implies confidence, but not certainty, that some person or institution will behave in an expected way. A trusting person decides to act in spite of uncertainty about the future and doubts about the reliability of others’ promises. Trust interacts with formal rules to determine the performance of political structures, bureaucracies, law, the courts, and market institutions. But trust is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, inter-personal trust can aid public accountability systems designed to curb corruption and self-dealing. On the other hand, it can further corrupt relationships and maintain patronage systems. If trust has been lost, we should seek to restore trust only in those institutions and individuals that further public values. Governments are needed in just those situations in which people cannot trust each other voluntarily to take others’ interests into account. If the state is reliable, honest, and even-handed in applying its rules—that is, if people trust it to be fair—state legitimacy is enhanced. As complex societies evolve, this increases the benefits of trust in public agents at the same time as it limits the need for trust based on family and friends. Thus, we need to ask if trust and reliability can help create legitimate, uncorrupt states, and if so, how these values can be produced. Given the difficulty of moral transformations, can institutional reform limit the need for virtue?

This essay provides a framework for thinking about these broad questions. The taxonomy developed below distinguishes between generalized trust in others, on the one hand, and trust that depends on specific interactions between trusting people and trustworthy institutions and individuals, on the other. I distinguish between trust as one-sided reliability and reciprocal trust and then apply my taxonomy to the control of corruption and to the case of Asia in particular. I conclude that measures of generalized trust are not very useful as indicators of where the most important problems lie. Rather reformers need to understand how institutions and attitudes interact in particular contexts to see where a lack of trust is most harmful and to understand how to establish public institutions that are not just trusted, but that actually are worthy of trust.

Section I outlines the relationship between trust and government functioning. This leads, in section II, to a discussion of corruption including policy responses that seek to improve the trustworthiness of government. Section III considers the intertwined issues of trust and corruption in Asia, with a special emphasis on the distinctive features of the links between trust and corruption control in that region. Section IV concludes with some directions for reform.

I. Generalized Trust, Reliability, and Reciprocal Trust

Many claim that societies cannot function without high levels of trust. Sometimes the discussion proceeds as if trust is valuable in and of itself as evidence of close interpersonal links. Trust and a strong civil society are taken to be synonymous. But disembodied trust is not a very meaningful concept. It is parasitic on other underlying values and must be studied in context. The values I emphasize are increases in individual
well-being and the creation of states viewed as legitimate by their citizens. In this section I present a
taxonomy of trust that will inform the discussion of corruption and of the Asian cases in the rest of the
paper. Table 1 summarizes my framework.

I.1. Generalized Trust and Social Capital

Generalized trust expresses a background psychological attitude, rather than trust in identifiable others
to do particular things.\textsuperscript{7} It has received considerable attention because of Robert Putnam=s claim that when
what he calls "social capital" is high, citizens express confidence and trust not only in each other but also in
public institutions.\textsuperscript{8} According to him, strong civil societies generate interpersonal trust that is transmissible
from the voluntary organizations and groups that produce it to the broader framework of democratic
participation. Hence, societies need to create opportunities for social capital to be produced through
voluntary activity based on friendship, loyalty, or commitment. Putnam believes that trust created at that
level will aid in the production of the generalized trust useful for the maintenance of a stable democracy.

Unfortunately, the available evidence does not demonstrate a strong link either between trust in
people within a particular organization and generalized trust in others or between generalized trust and trust
in state institutions. In 1990 and 1996-1997 the World Values Survey (WVS) asked whether, generally
speaking, Amost people can be trusted@ or whether Ayou can=t be too careful in dealing with people@.\textsuperscript{9} Such
generalized trust is associated with stable democracies. The number of continuous years of
democratic functioning between 1920 and 1995 is positively associated with high levels of interpersonal
trust as well as with GNP/per capita and expressions of well-being.\textsuperscript{10} Although this finding suggests that
generalized trust and democracy reinforce each other, it does not imply that the development of generalized
trust will generate strong democracies. Furthermore, as we will see below, this relationship does not hold as
a general matter in Asia.

Furthermore, participation in voluntary institutions does not reliably produce generalized trust in
others and hence does not promote democracy. According to one study, involvement with church groups
actually tended to decrease generalized trust, although volunteer work and charitable giving have a positive
influence. Furthermore, more trusting individuals are more likely to be involved in various civil society
groups; group membership does not have a transformative impact.\textsuperscript{11} Membership in voluntary organizations
played no independent role in determining the durability of democracy.\textsuperscript{12} Growing interpersonal trust—either
inside voluntary organizations or in general—does not necessarily translate into democratic benefits. These
negative results do not mean that trust is irrelevant. Rather, we need a more nuanced view of the concept
of trust and its relationship to state functioning. I try to provide such a framework in the following sections.

I.2. Trust as One-Sided Reliability

In order to understand the link between trust and state legitimacy, one must move from vague concepts,
such as generalized trust in others, to specific human and organizational interactions. Here, I distinguish
between one-sided reliability or confidence, and two-sided or reciprocal trust. In some situations, these
alternative types of trust can operate at cross-purposes. Central to the discussion of trust is the
trustworthiness of the person or institution. Naive trust in others or in the states is not something to be
applauded.

Under one-sided reliability person A decides whether or not to trust another person or institution, B,
on the basis of information about B=s incentives, motives, and competence. The situation is one-sided in
that the trusted person is uninterested in whether A is trustworthy. B may, however, be influenced by A=s
expected reactions to B=s actions. I distinguish three types of one-sided reliability.

A first is reputation-based trust that arises from one=s belief that the other can be trusted because it
is in his or her interest.\textsuperscript{13} Trust grows out of repeated interactions. A business person is trusted, not
because he appears especially moral or good, but because it is in his interest to be viewed as reliable. A
seller may act in a trustworthy way, to induce the particular buyer to return and also to send a signal to
other potential buyers. A second type of one-sided reliability is trust in a professional with specialized
knowledge such as a doctor or lawyer or a scientific expert.\textsuperscript{14} One trusts the professional both because she
is highly skilled and because she holds professional norms that value trustworthy behavior. The third one-sided model is rule-based trustworthiness that trust that an organization’s rules will be followed in a neutral, uncorrupt, and predictable way. This type is particularly relevant in the public sector.  

I.3. Reciprocal Trust

Now consider reciprocal trust. Here, guesses about the trustworthiness of others can affect one’s behavior. The links may be based on mutual calculations of each other’s interests, on feelings of personal affection and responsibility, or on shared values.

First, mutually reinforcing trust can be interest-based. Even in a hierarchical relationship where a principal (superior) requests an agent (inferior) to do something, trust does not flow only from the superior to the agent. Rather the agent also trusts the superior to carry out her side of the bargain by, for example, paying him when the job is done. Over time, the one who acts first may trust the second mover or may write an enforceable contract that reverses the burden of trust. The unfolding of interactions over space and time means that people shift from being the one who trusts to being the one who is trustworthy and back again. The very act of trusting may induce the other person to be more trustworthy, and so on in a benevolent spiral. Conversely, showing a person that he is distrusted may cause him to confirm your expectations.

Second, reciprocal trust can reflect warm personal feelings. People may trust others because they believe that the others wish them well. However, close personal relations can engender hatred and jealousy as well as love and affection. Distrust is sometimes pervasive in close-knit communities that give people little possibility of exit. Furthermore, trust in a network of close kin or ethnic group members may reduce trust in outsiders.

Third, reciprocal trust can reflect shared values and goals, not empathy. People might trust each other because they have a common belief in immorality of corruption and the moral value of cooperative and helpful behavior. This type of trust can reinforce the legitimacy of public institutions and overcome cooperation problems.

Although reciprocal trust often supports the state, it can also generate behavior that undermines state functions. On the one hand, close-knit criminal groups may create networks based on a mixture of empathy, threats, and shared goals that leave the police powerless. On the other hand, organizations based on interpersonal solidarity in the face of an illegitimate state can sow the seeds of revolutionary change.

Now consider interactions between large numbers of people with no collective organization. If reciprocity is based on moral motivations, the overall level of trustworthiness can be affected by the proportion of others who are also trustworthy. If a high proportion is trustworthy, this will encourage others to follow suit, and so on until only a few diehards cheat. Conversely, if most are distrustful and corrupt, even more may shift in that direction, until all but the moralists are lying, cheating, and engaging in bribery. A similar dynamic can operate if behavior depends on the chance of being caught behaving in a corrupt or untrustworthy way. The monitoring process may break down as the proportion of cheaters increases.

II. Economizing on Virtue: The Control of Corruption

Paradoxically, a deeply corrupt regime may operate with a high degree of reciprocal, affect-based trust between members of the in-group that controls the state. Those who rely on reciprocal, affect-based trust believe that officials will favor them whether or not they fulfill formal qualifications. Reciprocal trust based on personal connections operates at cross-purposes to trust as one-sided reliability. The corrupt official is an untrustworthy and dishonest agent of the public interest but a trustworthy friend and relative. Hence, in modern complex societies, state institutions must limit the role of reciprocal trust based on empathy and mutual self-interest. Developing one-sided trust based on reliable predictions is especially important. This requires organizational designers and legal reformers frequently to create systems that operate fairly and without favoritism.

Even trustworthy and honest behavior that is motivated by shared moral beliefs may undermine some kinds of rule-based systems. Superiors in an organization may want clear, neutral rules that ignore individual circumstances. An official who is motivated by his own moral beliefs may undermine a rule-based
system just as much as one who favors his nephews. A person who follows his ideological or religious beliefs, no matter what role he plays, can sabotage efforts to enhance the reliability of public institutions through promises of impartial, rule-based service delivery.

To limit inter-personal trust that upholds corrupt regimes and to enhance trust as reliability that supports fair and honest government, one needs to clarify what is being bought and sold in corrupt transactions. Reforms should both reduce the opportunities and the net benefits of giving and receiving bribes and shift the attitudes of politicians, public officials, and citizens away from personalized, corrupt, but mutually trusting, relationships. The goal is to reform the state so that officials and politicians understand their obligations to the citizenry as a whole to provide trustworthy service that is fair and efficient.

To accomplish this goal the public needs to be enlisted to check corrupt public officials. The anticorruption agenda can be part of overall efforts to increase government legitimacy by improving the transparency of government actions and by increasing the role of citizens beyond simply voting for the parties and candidates of their choice. Reforms will not occur, however, unless there are citizens willing to demand honest and trustworthy government. Martyrs and saints are always in short supply, but less altruistic people may be willing to engage in civic activities if the private costs are not too high and the promised social benefits are large.

Productive citizen and civil society involvement requires a package of linked reforms. These include public information provision, a free media with weak libel law protection for public figures, avenues for individual complaints, and laws that facilitate the establishment and funding of nonprofits organizations. The aim is to give officials reason to avoid making decisions based on a mixture of personal ties and personal financial gain to making decisions in a fair and impartial manner. The goal to move government from a system of mutual favor-giving based on reciprocal trust to one where one-sided trust prevails -- that is, a system where citizens trust officials to follow the rules.

Government must tell citizens what it is doing by publishing consolidated budgets, revenue collections, statutes and rules, and the proceedings of legislative bodies. Financial data should be audited and published by independent authorities. Freedom of information statutes that give citizens a right to access government information can be an important precondition for effective public oversight. But such an act will have little value if government does not gather much information. Many countries must first put information systems in order, provide for the publication of the most important documents, and assure public access to other unpublished material.

Even a government that keeps good records and makes them available to the public may operate with impunity if no one bothers to analyze the available information -- or if analysts are afraid to raise their voices. Accountability has three linked aspects. First, if the aim is to pressure government to act in the public interest, both the media and organized groups (business, labor, civil society) must be able to access information, have routes to publicize their concerns, and be free of threats to their freedom of operation. Second, if the goal is government accountability to individuals, the state must set up avenues for individual complaints and must actually respond to citizen concerns. Third, the legal landscape must allow civil society and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) easily to organize and to raise funds so that they can perform the first function. In short, moving toward a trustworthy government is not just a question of improving the character of public officials and the moral fiber of citizens. The aim is not to make officials and citizens more trusting but rather to make officials more worthy of trust, not from their in-group, but from citizens and businesses in general.

III. Trust and Corruption in Asia

Is there anything special about the relationship between trust, government performance and corruption in Asia? Asia consists of a wide diversity of cultures, ethnicities and state structures—from well-established democracies to non-democratic states. Market principles govern the economy to varying degrees, and state involvement in the economy and society varies. Nevertheless, research on trust region highlights some recurrent themes.

Survey evidence indicates relatively high levels of trust in government compared to other regions. The Transparency International Global Barometer Survey from 2010 found that in East Asia those surveyed
were almost equally split between expressing a lot of trust in government and those with little or no trust (49% versus 42%). Latin Americans were least trusting with 75% in the low trust categories. In Africa and Northern Europe just over one-half were in the low trust category (51% and 53%, respectively). It is not clear what these data mean. Do people trust government to be fair and impartial or they trust it to favor their own interests? Does trust in government simply reflect the fact that most people’s household income has grown in recent years?

Some believe that a high level of generalized trust in others translates into trust in public institutions. As my discussion of Putnam indicated, I am skeptical about this claim, and the Asian case demonstrates that it is oversimplified. In Asia there are three different relationships between generalized trust and trust in institutions. At one extreme are one-party states with a socialist history. There those surveyed express high levels of trust in public institutions (from 80-99%) and relatively high levels of generalized trust (over 50%). Trust, however, seems unrelated to the power or efficacy of the institution, so that parliaments are trusted by almost everyone even though they do not have much power. The rest of the countries surveyed expressed lower levels of generalized trust (from 9% to 42%) and also much lower levels of trust in institutions. This group can be subdivided into two groups: countries with low generalized trust and a fairly high ratio of institutional to generalized trust, and those where there is a roughly positive relationship between generalized trust and trust in government. It is not clear what causal story one can tell based on this cross-country variability. At the very least, a simple claim that high interpersonal trust leads to more trusted state bodies is not proven.

Adding corruption into the mix further complicates the picture. Global cross-country work suggests that equality, low corruption, and generalized trust tend to go together. However, in Asia the pattern is mixed. In some countries low levels of perceived corruption go along with quite low levels of generalized trust and considerable skepticism about institutions. Perhaps citizens’ skepticism about public institutions helps keep corruption in check. However, one might think that if the state apparatus, in fact, is quite honest, that this would lead to high trust even if people view the state with critical eye. Conversely, in the emerging socialist countries, where household surveys reveal high levels of trust in government, others see high levels of corruption. These data are difficult to interpret. Perhaps they just indicate the difficulty of doing survey research. A cluster of countries with high levels of reported corruption, mostly in Southeast Asia, are a mixed bag in terms of the trust variables. One wonders if the relatively high levels of trust in some institutions is the result either of ignorance or of a belief that officials can be "trusted" to show favoritism, not impartial rule-bound behavior.

These complexities are a challenge to research that associates generalized inter-personal trust with trust in government, and trust in government with a lack of corruption. That association does not hold as a general matter in Asia, and there are many anomalous cases outside Asia as well. However, it does not clearly indicate where survey respondents would place themselves in table 1’s taxonomy as they consider their relationships with different institutions.

One explanation for the survey results is that citizens in some states have low expectations for government so that the survey responses indicate that they are pleasantly surprised at how well the state performs. This positive attitude may be strengthened by a country’s good economic performance. If a country is growing rapidly, that may dominate concerns about official corruption. In stagnant economies, confidence in government is likely to suffer especially if the state is blamed for slow growth. Further, in a robust democracy citizens trust government only if it is reliable and conforms to the rules, and they are alert for evidence of waste and malfeasance. Broad cross-country studies cannot sort out these conflicting explanations, but we do have some survey and experimental evidence that sheds light on some of the mechanisms at work.

Corruption combined with collectivist values could lead to satisfied in-group participants operating through reciprocal trust. The mass of outsiders and excluded businesses, however, could view the government as corrupt, and, as a consequence, they would not trust the system to operate fairly. In such cultures surveys would show that generalized trust is relatively low at the same time as internal or in-group trust is high. For example, one study showed that societies based on close family ties (reciprocal affect-based trust) are particularly likely to experience lower levels of generalized inter-personal trust. There is a negative relationship between a measure of familism and interpersonal trust, as measured by the World Values Survey for the 1999-2002. Only a few Asian countries are included, and for them the picture is
mixed. Six of the eight East and South Asian countries included are above the regression line indicating relatively high levels of interpersonal trust relative to other countries with strong family ties.

The problem for those concerned with the control of corruption is the difficulty of tracing the link from in-group reciprocal trust, to generalized trust, to one-sided trust in government reliability, to reductions in corruption. The worry is that if people experience reciprocal trust within their in-group, they will seek to help their members achieve political power. In return they will expect to receive individual or group benefits. Outsiders, both inside and outside the country, will see a corrupt, patronage-based system based on the mutual exchange of favors that often look indistinguishable from bribes. Favorized insiders see in-group reciprocal trust and mutual support. However, in an ethnically homogeneous society almost everyone may feel like an insider so that perceptions of corruption are concentrated in the international business and investment community. Investor may be accused of cultural insensitivity, but the real problem is in-group control that limits overall investment and entrepreneurship opportunities.

However, the role of trust in Asian societies is complex and cannot be reduced to the simple claim that people trust those in their in-group and distrust everyone else. For example, one study of mid-level bank managers from East and Southeast Asia and from the Illinois and Hawaii in the United States suggests the limits of that hypothesis. Those surveyed in the US had higher average levels of trust both of their own ethnic group and of others compared to the Asian bankers. The Americans had less of a bias in favor of trusting their own ethnic group or family, but within Asia there was not a strong connection between trusting members of one’s own ethnic group and lack of generalized trust.

Unfortunately, it is not clear exactly what mechanisms relate attitudes to in-groups and to out-groups. Are people simply prejudiced so that strong in-group affiliation is not just solidarity with group members, but also reflects a belief in their group’s inherent superiority? Does it matter if the out-group is poor and disadvantaged, such as lower caste individuals in India, or wealthy and economically dominant, such as the Chinese in parts of South-East Asia? In strong collectivist cultures, does the in-group supply needed services, resolve disputes and provide security that in other societies are provided by the state? If so, does that mean those in such groups do not need to trust either outsiders or state officials? If so, the surveys measure not just attitudes but also state capacity. We do not know, but such analyses ought to help sort out the underlying factors at work. Such research should study how citizens might both maintain close trusting relations and create a modern state that uses impartial, fair criteria to allocate benefits, not in-group connections.

A laboratory experiment using subjects from two Southeast Asian countries tried to get at some of these issues. The experiments involved subjects who all perceived themselves to be part of the same in-group. Using a game in which the individually rationale response was not to cooperate, the researchers found high levels of cooperation, indicating high inter-personal trust. The authors explain the high levels of behavioral and associational social capital as the reason for high trust. However, although in one country both generalized trust and trust in institutions was high, in the other general trust is quite high but institutional trust is quite low overall. Corruption is reportedly high in both countries. Once again we see the weak link between individual interactions between those who seem to trust or empathize with each other and trust in the reliability of state institutions.

To understand corruption and its impact one needs to understand citizens’ relationships to each other and to the state. In Asia, claims that strong in-group trust translates to weak out-group trust are not uniformly borne out. Similarly, corruption can be high in states that otherwise have gained the trust of their citizens. This does not mean, however, that corruption in benign. Perhaps payoffs and cronyism favor some over others, and the disadvantaged are not willing to speak up. Perhaps, trust is genuine but ill-informed or built on a history of deference to authority. We need a deeper understanding of what it means to trust other individuals and to trust institutions and to connect expressions of trust with the actual performance of public and private institutions in furthering public values and operating without corrupt self-dealing.

IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications

Given the uneasy relationship between trust, corruption, and government performance, the implications for anti-corruption policy are complex, especially in Asia. Any explanation that relies on culture, such as observations of in-group solidarity and generalized trust, is a challenge to policymakers. If culture is deep
and immutable, policy can only operate at the margins. Furthermore, if what others call corruption is acceptable to a nation’s citizens and is understood as a part of a valid cultural practice, reform is not plausible. The rest of the world needs to accept as given these cultural practices and decide whether or not to engage with societies where they are prevalent. For those convinced of the long-run negative impact of corruption in undermining economic growth, human flourishing and government legitimacy, that is a discouraging result.

In practice, however, so-called cultural attitudes need not be immutable, and changed circumstances can lead to changed practices. If traditionally powerful in-groups are challenged by democratic and popular pressures, entrenched systems can change. If old practices are dysfunctional under more modern conditions, demonstrating that fact can plausibly change both attitudes and behavior. Changes in the fundamental conditions of political and social life can change behavior in ways that increase or decrease corruption and trust in the state. For example, in Indonesia trust in government has grown in the past decade in spite of declines elsewhere. The explanation, according to one study, is government reform after the fall of Suharto in 1998 aimed at reducing corruption and strengthening state institutions.\textsuperscript{36} Similarly, in South Korea successful reform in the tax system depended on institutional reform, not a major transformation in public values.\textsuperscript{37} In other words, past distrust of state institutions turned into trust, not because of a change in culture but because of a change in the state behavior. One can argue, in fact, that the original high level of distrust was one of the motivations for the policy change.

In general, even when cultural factors encourage corruption and distrust in government, reforms can lower the benefits and raise the costs of particular corrupt transactions. Even when culture and past practice favor corruption, a decline in its net gains can help spur reform and help restore trust. But corruption can also be controlled indirectly by limits on political power and by changes in public attitudes toward the exercise of that power. This strategy involves giving people and groups a way to complain about poor government service provision. To facilitate such activities, the government supplies information about its actions, the media and the public voice complaints, and private organizations and individuals push for public accountability. The goal is to increase governmental openness, leaving it more vulnerable to popular discontent. Many regimes, even nominally democratic ones, may view such policies with suspicion. They are, nevertheless, an essential check on corruption and on other forms of dishonest self-dealing that can arise if officials are insulated from popular oversight. One route to a more trustworthy state is the creation of institutions empowered to hold officials to account over and above criminal investigations for malfeasance.
REFERENCES


Box 1: Global Barometer Survey Results.
The Global Corruption Barometer asked respondents whom they most trust to fight corruption in their country. The choices were: government leaders, business/private sector, non-governmental organizations, the media, international organizations, nobody, or “I don’t know/prefer not to answer”. Eliminating that last category from the data produces the following breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Government Leaders</th>
<th>Private Sector/Business</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>The Media</th>
<th>International Organizations (WB, IMF, UN)</th>
<th>Nobody</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/Canada</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/Oceania</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East Asia</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Southeast Asia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- South Asia</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Russia/Caucasus</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, one quarter do not think that any institution can be trusted to fight corruption. In Asia the number varies by sub-region from 12% to 46%. At the country level it turns out that even when governments are perceived as quite corrupt, many survey respondents still think that their leaders are most trusted to lead the fight. We do not know if these results reflect the perceived weakness of other institutions or faith in the anti-corruption rhetoric of leaders in spite of widespread corruption in people’s day-to-day lives. Perhaps people are simply expressing the realistic belief that reform cannot occur unless the government is deeply involved.

Trust in NGOs and the media as corruption-fighters is similar overall but varies widely by country. At the country level trust in the media is sometimes high when NGOs are seen as ineffective and vice versa. For example, in Asia, trust in the media is as high as 38% in one country and as low as 12% in another; trust in NGOs ranges from 40% to 5%. However, in Central Asia (including Russia) neither institution inspires much trust. The low levels of trust in some countries for both these groups may reflect the fact that the media and NGOs are either strictly controlled or economically weak in some countries. Even if these bodies are extremely trustworthy in a moral sense, they can’t be trusted effectively to fight corruption. Surely, respondents read the question as asking not just about moral rectitude but also about efficacy.

The high number of people who responded “nobody” suggests that there is a space for NGOs to play a constructive role. However, the NGOs that exist today are not widely recognized as trustworthy leaders of the anti-corruption effort. They may be playing a key secondary role, but they are not where most people look for reform. Realistically, government leaders must be part of the effort. However, at a minimum the
survey suggests that the advocacy community needs to take steps to convince citizens that they are effective and trustworthy advocates for reform--not just as a matter of public perceptions but in fact.
### Table 1: Trust Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Trust</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>Background psychological conditions</td>
<td>Citizen believes others in society worthy of trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-sided reliability</td>
<td>Reputation/repeated interactions</td>
<td>Businessperson acts in trustworthy way to send reputational signal to other customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional training and values</td>
<td>Patient trusts doctor due to specialized training and values of the profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conformity with rules</td>
<td>Citizen trusts that members of a bureaucracy will abide by official rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal trust</td>
<td>Shared interest</td>
<td>Two businesspeople both gain from fulfilling a contract and trust each other accordingly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Empathy</td>
<td>Trust emerges between family members from sincere love and affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shared Values</td>
<td>Citizens of a anti-corruption CSO trust each other due to shared belief in curbing corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Warren 1999b.
7 Hardin 2002.
9 Inglehart 1997:399.
10 Inglehart 1997: 183.
17 Hardin 2002.
21 Braithwaite 1998.
24 Fehr and Gächter 2000; Sugden 1984.
27 Carlino 2010: 88. In Asia the survey covered only China, Japan, S. Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.
29 Hardin 2002.
30 I leave the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore (TI-CPI of 8.2 and 9.2) to one side. They are not included in the
World Values Survey. Although they are often held up as models, it appears difficult to generalize their situation to
other Asian countries.
31 Chang & Chu 2006.
32 Realo, Allik, & Greenfield, 2008.
33 Huff & Kelley 2003.
34 Chua 2003
35 Carpenter, Daniere, & Takahashi 2004.
36 Tjiptoberijanto & Rowen 2010.
37 Kim 2010.

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