1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service was established in May 1994, with broad terms of reference into the existence of corruption within the Service, the efficacy of its Internal Informants program and of its internal Affairs Branch. It delivered two interim reports recommending urgent change in the internal investigation structure, and in the Disciplinary/Dismissal procedures, followed by a Final Report released in May 1997.

1.2 Along the way, it established a significant multi disciplinary task force, carried out proactive current investigations involving extensive physical and electronic surveillance, and public hearings at which suspect officers were examined on oath both in relation to their policing activities, and financial means.

1.3 These examinations were conducted with the aid of sophisticated financial and intelligence analysis, and were based on the Commission's own inquiries and on information derived pursuant to arrangements made under law, or with the agreement of a large range of government and private agencies and organisations, and also as the result of the exercise of its statutory powers to compel the provision of information, to execute searches under warrant, and the like.

1.4 What then were the results of the Commission?

2. CORRUPTION FOUND

2.1 The Commission very quickly found its way beyond the positive reassurances, given by Senior Command at the commencement of its public hearings, that the Service was free of entrenched or systemic corruption. It did so via the "roll over" of a very experienced detective. That officer had been exposed to corruption very early in his career, and found it replicated in every subsequent posting, particularly when working in drug law enforcement. He was deployed by the Commission to work under cover for approximately six months, and gathered evidence of the reception of bribe money from the vice operators and drug dealers who had been paying his group for years, and of the sharing of that money with other senior detectives.

2.2 Once his role was revealed, other detectives who had worked with him, or in similar areas, progressively roiled over and admitted their involvement in corruption and serious misconduct, despite having denied any wrongdoing when first called as witnesses. Some of those detectives agreed to act undercover before publicly admitting their guilt, and so the net expanded, first at Kings Cross, then through other squads and other regions. They also carried with them a number of criminals who similarly, after initial sworn denials of participation in corruption, confessed their involvement and supplied valuable information as to the networks, and the nature and extent of corruption involved, both of the conventional kind and that referred to as "process" or "noble cause" corruption.
2.3 The continuous supply of information, and the availability of formerly corrupt detectives prepared to work undercover, to wear listening devices, and to meet criminals and other corrupt police in controlled situations, produced a dramatic ripple effect and widening of the pool of corruption exposed. It also created an aura of uncertainty and a lowered resistance on the part of some, although not by any means all, of the corrupt police identified.

2.4 The forms of corruption occurring on a regular basis, admitted by police who rolled over and assisted the Commission, or who acknowledged their guilt when confronted with covertly recorded evidence, or with the confessions of their associates, or with damning analyses of their financial affairs, included the following:

1. protection of gaming and vice interests and of unlicensed clubs, in exchange for payments and other benefits such as free drinks and the services of prostitutes;

2. protection of drug dealers, 'licensing' of certain drug cartels and of "shooting galleries", and also of certain gaming establishments, by elimination of their competitors;

3. stealing of money, and of drugs found during the execution of search warrants, and the recycling of the latter usually to favoured dealers or informants;

4. assault and robbery of civilians, and serious abuses of their civil rights;

5. extortion, and deceit, practised on criminals by way of pretence as to favours promised for their general protection, or for the compromise of pending prosecutions;

6. extortion and shakedowns practised in relation to serial sexual abusers of children and drug dealers;

7. systematic group falsification of records for the purpose of obtaining unjustified allowances, and to cover absences from duty for recreational purposes;

8. leaking of confidential information to persons who were under investigation or otherwise interested in its reception, and warnings of pending gaming, licensing, and drug raids;

9. compromise of prosecutions by the gutting of police briefs, and loss of material evidence or witnesses in return for payment;

10. assistance with favourable but false letters of comfort (on sentencing), and facilitation of bails;

11. motor vehicle insurance fraud;

12. recreational drug abuse and supply of drugs between police for this purpose;

13. significant alcohol abuse and long lunches by detectives and their supervisors; and

14. process corruption aimed at securing unjustified convictions, involving the fabrication and planting of evidence, perjury, falsification of documents, and the procuring of confessions through serious assault and misrepresentation.

2.5 The forms of corruption found were not surprising - what was surprising was the extent of their existence, and the areas into which they had penetrated. Perhaps the most disturbing disclosures related to the activities of an elite joint Commonwealth-State Task Force on Drug Trafficking. This was a Force comprised of detectives of supposedly high calibre, integrity and experience, hand chosen from the New South Wales Police Service and the Australian Federal Police, supported with the best available resources and tasked with targeting high level drug dealers. Although it achieved a high conviction rate, it quickly became a hotbed of corruption, and there were strong suggestions that participation in corrupt practices became a rite of passage.

2.6 A further disturbing feature was the suggestion from a number of officers that having been recruited into corrupt practices in their early years, they expected that on attaining Commissioned rank, they would by and large leave such practices behind. The understanding was that they should allow others to reap their share of corrupt rewards, that they should not be too anxious to detect or target them, and that they should only respond, (and then somewhat savagely) when someone was caught out in corrupt conduct that could not be covered up. It is the presence of this feature which makes the fight against corruption from within so difficult. It represents a double standard that creates
an impossible position for young police, because of:

1. the bad example it sets;
2. the cynicism and loss of trust it fosters and
3. the absence of a clear message as to the way the young officer should behave.

2.7 The strength of this culture was seen in the limited success of an amnesty offered to police for a closed period at the end of 1995. Save for offences of the most serious kind an indemnity from prosecution was offered to corrupt police in return for their resignation, and commitment to assist the Royal Commission, and other relevant law enforcement agencies. Although advantage was taken of this opportunity by some police, including some detectives who were able to further expand the knowledge of the Commission into areas of organised corruption, many stood back in the face of their inevitable exposure. They were quite unable to explain their reluctance to seize the olive branch offered, which could keep them out of gaol, other than to identify the instinctive institutional reaction to any form of internal inquiry, drummed into them over years of service.

2.8 It is this institutional response, and the traditional respect offered to a class of detective, (the "metro cop") seen as a hard officer, knowledgeable in the ways of the city, fraternising closely with organised crime figures, providing protection or favours for some (often the most powerful) and maintaining a degree of order through those associations but personally profiting through information supporting arrests and subsequent promotion for ostensibly meritorious (but in fact corrupt) service, or through bribes and other services, which has to be the focus of attack. The hope is that it can be replaced by a culture which values professionalism, recognises that turning a blind eye to corrupt practice is as bad as active involvement, rewards those who demonstrate integrity, and emphasises the need for commitment to the true role of policing.

3. WHY CORRUPT PRACTICES EMERGED

3.1 Corruption does not emerge suddenly. By its nature it is spawned in stealth, and only grows in a climate in which it is comfortable. There is precedent of it being a cyclical phenomenon, both locally and overseas. It is capable of being arrested, but it is equally capable of regenerating, and sometimes in forms, and to an extent, that is even more malignant than before.

3.2 So it was with the New York City Police Department when in the 1970's the Knapp Commission discovered widespread corruption of the systemic or institutionalised kind, in which a blind eye was turned to the breach of a wide variety of laws at a local level, in return for payments shared on a formalised basis between patrol officers, detectives, supervisors and commanders. By 1994, the Mollen Commission of Inquiry found a new and more insidious form of corruption infecting parts of the city, particularly in high crime precincts with an active narcotics trade. Rather than police taking money to accommodate criminals by closing their eyes to illegal activities, they were now seen as acting as criminals themselves, especially in connection with the drug trade.

3.3 This was precisely what we found in New South Wales, despite several earlier inquiries and Royal Commissions that had looked into the Service.

Why does this occur? The reasons are several.

The Crime Control Justification

3.4 There had been long term tolerance in New South Wales of victimless crime in the form of SP betting, gaming, vice and unlicensed sales of liquor. The traditional justification for such tolerance, and for the willingness of police to accept payments for turning a blind eye, was that by allowing a chosen few to continue, such activities could be kept within acceptable limits. Further, it was assumed that they caused no great harm, in a city the size of Sydney, for which a reputation for a degree of raciness and character did no harm. This excuse conveniently overlooked the compromise of individual integrity, and the cynicism it breeds at all levels of the Police Service. Officers who see crime untouched, or who are thwarted from targeting certain areas, naturally assume the worst in their commanders, and become reluctant to report corruption. The message that goes out is simple and obvious protection can be secured, and it is dangerous to question it.

Dumping Grounds

3.5 Another problem that emerged within the New York City Police Department was shared by the
New South Wales Police Force the tendency to create dumping grounds for the misfits, the malcontents, and the incompetent or less disciplined officers, in high corruption areas, and then by some form of twisted logic to use them to "blood" trainees as quickly as possible into the hard realities of policing. Inevitably, police who believed that they have been dumped in such a location will develop a perverted pride in their unsavoury reputation, and then act it out. So it was in NSW. Many young police were tested out for their preparedness to succumb to temptation, and to support the culture of loyalty to their colleagues, in environments such as this.

**Preservation of the Reputation of the Service**

3.6 Another important circumstance, similarly shared with the NYCPD, has been the institutionalised pressure to suppress, or contain, the disclosure of corruption in the belief that this is in the best interests of the Service so far as its reputation and morale are concerned. A poor external reputation, so it is believed, will worry the public, reduce it's co-operation and trust, and empower criminals. This kind of philosophy came to be expressed in a number of ways, each of which was inimical to corruption prevention. They included:

1. problem solving through transfer, or facilitated early retirement on a pension;

2. suppression, and editing of adverse audit reports, or active discouragement of critical comment on the part of those whose task it was to identify problems;

3. the adoption of narrow based reactive internal investigations that fell far short of the more aggressive, proactive operations that are directed at criminals involving surveillance, informants, undercover operations, turned witnesses and the like;

This kind of attitude is an inevitable recipe for collapse of command responsibility for the maintenance of integrity, and for reinforcement of the "them and us" culture that encourages a defensive mentality. It sends a very powerful message to the ranks not only that the rhetoric to which they are exposed in this respect is empty, but that the opposite is what is truly expected. It is an attitude that needs to be stood on its head, but also one that requires a degree of public education. The Service, the media, and politicians need to be convinced that the uncovering of corruption by the Service, is not necessarily evidence of bad management or integrity problems. Rather, it can be seen as evidence that the system is working, and that there is a brake being applied to problems that would otherwise foster and multiply before the inevitable scandal erupted.

**The Police Culture and its Code of Silence**

3.7 Woven in and around all of these problems has been the culture that is so much the part of any Police Service. It is inevitable that it develop within any group that faces the dangers and difficulties of policing. It is a vocation in which its members come to socialise and depend on each other both on and off the job. It is one in which in times of crisis, heavy reliance needs to be placed on the loyalty and immediate response of fellow officers. Many of the work experiences cannot readily be shared with outsiders, and tension is often broken in ways that might not be seen in other circles to be politically correct.

In dealing with criminals, and the less savoury elements of society, friendship, respect, and courtesy are not always returned and it is easy to view the environment as hostile. It is also easy for police to feel that the value of their work is not appreciated by the public and that the latter are far too ready to complain about minor matters.

Inevitably, in these circumstances police will band together, and develop an intensive group loyalty. This loyalty is entirely positive if employed in the interests of legitimate policing, but it can easily be distorted, when called in aid by the corrupt.

3.8 It is the insidious pressure of this negative aspect of the culture that has most inhibited the attempts of the Service to combat corruption. Officer after officer told us about it, and of the fears they held if known to be a "give up". These extended to being:

1. ostracised;

2. the butt of practical jokes and worse;

3. the recipient of offensive and threatening letters or actual physical assault;
4. informed that if in trouble or the subject of an "officer down" call, they need not expect assistance, and
5. perhaps worst of all the subject of institutional payback or discipline for minor infractions.

These officers informed us of the expectation that their reputation for breaching the code of silence would never leave them, and that as a misfit they would eventually be forced out of the Service, or effectively frozen in a meaningless job at their current rank.

3.9 Unfortunately this is an aspect of the culture that has been shared by the honest and corrupt alike, and it is one that has to be targeted as vigorously as any other aspect in the reform process, because:

1. the notion that loyalty to colleagues is more important than loyalty to the Service is not overlooked by the corrupt or those susceptible to corruption, and can only give them confidence;
2. silence, or active interference with internal investigations, renders the task of those undertaking such inquiries next to impossible;
3. it places self interest before duty, and damages morale;
4. ultimately, it taints the reputation of all and risks jeopardising the safety of an honest officer who comes into contact with a criminal who has been stood over, or let down, by a corrupt member of the Service one time too many.

Moreover, it breeds a kind of cynicism, a feeling of disempowerment, and an erosion of pride, in those honest police who despise the corrupt members of the Service and silently hope they could be removed from their ranks.

The Nature of the job

3.10 It cannot be gainsaid that for some the nature of the job is corrupting. The powers Entrusted to police to carry arms use force and even take lives in hopefully rare circumstances, to inquire into deep and dark secrets, to eavesdrop on private conversations, and to deprive citizens of their liberty, are very substantial powers. Conversely with their significance, they are most often exercised by the younger and less experienced officers working at street level, than they are by commanders with the wisdom of age and experience. Moreover, they are exercisable in circumstances where the opportunities for temptation and corruption are often very high. If those opportunities are available, as they have been, in an environment where training in integrity and ethics is lacking, where first line supervision is poor, and where the risk of detection and successful prosecution or severance from the Service are low, then it is little wonder that many police have succumbed.

Process Corruption

3.11 The circumstances that have allowed process corruption to develop are complex, and its study is complicated by the fact that often the truly corrupt rely upon the more altruistic reasons for its adoption, as an excuse or mask for their venality. In its various forms of perjury, planting of evidence, falsification of documents, forced confessions, violence and even theft of drugs or money, it tends to be explained by reference to:

1. the inadequacies of the judicial system and frustration of honest police trying to lock up those they know are guilty of crime;
2. the need to even the odds in a fight against criminals who are not constrained by any code or rules other than those they set for themselves;
3. the need to control the streets, by a display of strength and capacity to put away or teach a hard lesson to those who challenge law and order;
4. the "taxation" of criminals, particularly drug dealers, who might otherwise either escape justice, or receive a penalty that is seen to be disproportionately lenient;
5. the message given by political parties that crime control, and aggressive law and order campaigns of policing are expected, which cannot be delivered unless corners are cut;
6. the message given by Commanders that high arrest rates are expected, and that performance in this respect is likely to be better recognised and rewarded than a display of integrity;

7. the impression that fighting according to the rules will be seen as a sign weakness, making life on the streets even more dangerous; and

8. the fact that police are human after all, and cannot always be expected to ignore provocation or insult.

3.12 While the superficial attraction of some of these arguments cannot be ignored, the reality is that as often as process corruption has been the result of "honourable" motives, it has also been engendered by black motives.

Whatever the motivation, experience shows that there is even greater reluctance to reveal this form of corruption because of the numbers of persons potentially involved, and its acceptance as a reality of policing.

3.13 The problems that have emerged from this form of corruption, most of which have probably been unappreciated by those who have resorted to it, are manifold:

1. once an officer has become involved in any form of process corruption, and has been forced to prepare false documentation, or to give false evidence, he or she is potentially compromised for all time. Not only is that officer vulnerable to pressure from other police to remain silent for the immediate matter and other, matters, but he or she has begun to learn the practice of lying and covering up, and to see the ease with which it can be practised.

2. unlawful short cuts and perjury are often transparent to juries, and lead to a lack of confidence in police evidence, and respect for the Service as a whole;

3. the "taxation" of drugs or money from criminals can soon become a more general practice once the taste for extra "earnings" is obtained. The practices learned, and the awareness acquired that few if any criminals are likely to complain, and that even fewer members of the Service are likely to bring the matter to notice, are not always left behind;

4. cynicism and disrespect is engendered for Senior commanders who seem not only to tolerate such practices, but also lend great deference to the metro cops who revel in such practices, (often for mixed motives).

**Failure of Supervision and Command Accountability**

3.14 Absent real supervision, and accountability by commanders and supervisors for failure to identify and deal with corrupt practices, and action from Senior Command that matches rhetoric, the development of entrenched corruption is inevitable. Part of the problem in this regard is the lack of any real sense of responsibility by local supervisors and commanders who take the view that corruption control should be left to Internal Affairs.

The problem is compounded when this is associated with a lack of willingness on the part of Internal Affairs to share the burden, and to pass on relevant information to local commanders and supervisors. While this in part can be attributed to the need for operational security, it does mean that a valuable resource can be frozen out of the circuit. After all it is the local supervisor and commander who should be best placed to know what is going on, to observe and to report tell tale signs of corruption.

If wilfully blind to their duty they should be held accountable; if effective in detecting corrupt practices they should be recognised. Yet typically in Police Services that have a corruption problem, the performance of commanders and supervisors in the area of corruption is rarely the subject of critical assessment or review. Nor is corruption accepted as a Service wide problem.

4. **WHY WAS THE CORRUPTION NOT DETECTED**

4.1 This was a critical question for the Commission, since there was an elaborate structure in place, designed to detect and punish corruption.

That structure involve a combination of internal investigation by the Police Service, and civilian
oversight through the Independent Commission Against Corruption (the ICAC) and the Office of the Ombudsman.

**Internal Investigations**

4.2 A number of factors contributing to the limited success of internal investigations were identified, including:

1. the difficulty of police investigating police - a concept which ran headlong into the adverse aspects of the police culture previously mentioned;

2. the reactive focus of the complaints system on single instances of misconduct, and their fragmentation within a rigid formula, a system which did not allow for a classification of complaints in a way reflecting their different levels of seriousness, tended to conceal the discovery of links and patterns indicative of organised corruption, and overlooked the broader management and intelligence considerations and opportunities for early remedial intervention;

3. the concentration on an adversarial complaint and investigative system in which punitive rather than remedial action inhibited police from admitting to mistakes, and encouraged a culture of group cover-up and denial;

4. the limited resources given to the Professional Responsibility Command, and the downgraded, unpopular status of holding office within that Command, in some quarters regarded as a 'retirement haven' for those who did not otherwise fit the mould, or, alternatively, as a mere stepping stone to promotion (without commitment to the job);

5. the failure to successfully utilise intelligence, covert techniques, surveillance and the like, or to attempt the rollover of individual officers able to expose a wider net of corruption;

6. the failure to use broad-based financial and intelligence analysis, the lack of communication between regional and central internal Affairs Units, and the failure to sufficiently involve commanders in the management of, and responsibility for, misconduct within their command;

7. an inherent bias in investigations as the result of which the Service failed to carry out impartial investigations, or to pursue allegations with the same rigour or approach seen in ordinary criminal inquiries;

8. the lack of security in relation to corruption investigations, with information and warnings being promptly passed on to police under investigation which compromised the investigations, and led to a general lack of trust on the part of potential informants (both internal and external) in the confidentiality of any information provided, and in their own safety;

9. the use of ineffective investigative techniques, for example, the issue of directive memoranda calling for an explanation in writing which allowed groups of police under investigation to be forewarned of the inquiry, and to manufacture a watertight defence in collaboration;

10. the use of an investigation methodology which frequently began and ended with the officer's denial of the allegations, on the basis that faced with such a response the facts could not be determined, but which allowed corrupt police to return to duty with their reputations enhanced either as 'untouchables' or as effective police who were hurting criminals thereby attracting complaints;

11. the imposition of penalties which were not always commensurate with the misconduct found, including 'penalty transfers' without sufficient significance being given to questions of personal dishonesty or to the danger of moving a problem officer elsewhere within the Service; and

4.3 Each of the ICAC and Ombudsman has undertaken valuable inquiries leading to significant reports on specific matters of concern, and on corruption prevention and education measures. The ability of these agencies to contribute significantly to any fight against corruption in the period preceding the Royal Commission was, however, limited by:

1. their charters which in each case extended to the supervision of many other public agencies, officials and services; their limited staff and resources;
2. their substantial dependence on the secondment of members of the Service as investigators;

3. the inability on the part of the Ombudsman to deploy coercive powers or to undertake proactive investigations, and the former (but not present) reluctance, in the case of the ICAC, to employ electronic surveillance and other similar techniques;

4. the lack of a specific division, in the case of the ICAC, focused on police corruption; and

5. the emphasis of the ICAC on corruption prevention and education at the possible expense of its investigative role.

4.4 Such greater success that the Royal Commission enjoyed, can be attributed to a number of factors, including:

1. its extensive use of coercive powers to compel witnesses to give evidence and produce documents, and to enter relevant premises to inspect and copy documents;

2. its heavy reliance on wide-based proactive inquiries, and electronic and physical surveillance;

3. its greater resources;

4. its willingness to turn witnesses (both police and criminals) and to use them covertly;

5. its heavy reliance on intelligence analysis for patterns of associations, complaints, and compromised internal investigations;

6. its use of financial profiling and analysis to demonstrate lifestyles that could not be sourced from a police salary;

7. the deployment of multi-disciplinary task forces in which the skills of investigators, lawyers and analysts could be combined;

8. the use of investigators drawn from law enforcement agencies other than the NSW Police Service, who lacked all connection to hostile and corrupt elements within that Service and who had no fears about their career prospects in confronting matters that might embarrass it;

9. its direct encouragement of the public, and victims of police corruption and misconduct, to come forward and assist, under conditions in which they could be protected, assured of confidentiality, and where appropriate spared from criminal liability;

10. the active co-operation of other law enforcement agencies and financial institutions;

11. its declared commitment to actively pursue corruption in all its facets without any agenda to protect reputations, or any preconceptions as to the state of the Service; and

12. its use of state of the art technology in investigations in the storage and use of intelligence and information collected and in the presentation of evidence.

4.5 Additionally, it had the advantage of being able to conduct investigations and hearings on an inquisitorial basis, unconfined by the technical rules governing hearings based on the adversarial system, or by the criminal standard of proof.

5. THE WAY AHEAD

5.1 A range of strategies has been developed which may be briefly mentioned. They include:

1. the creation of the Police Integrity Commission, an external agency modelled on the Royal Commission and sharing its extensive coercive powers with authority to:
   - conduct major investigations;
   - monitor and co-ordinate the operations of the revamped Police Office of Internal Affairs; and
engage in joint operations with other law enforcement agencies where an element of corruption was suspected, particularly in those operations directed against organised crime;

2. the adoption by the Service of a number of specific integrity or anti-corruption measures, including:

- the use of independent observers (i.e. from other sections of the Police Service) to supervise arrests and searches, in operations where significant seizures of drugs, money, or other property are expected;

- the video taping of such operations, and audio recording of conversations at the place of arrest, or other dealings, prior to the time at which formal records of interview are conducted (by means of the electronically recorded procedures currently in use);

- greater field involvement of supervisors in operations, and education of supervisors and commanders, in the identification of signs of corruption, and of corruption hazards within their commands.

- more rigid attention to informant management, including the use of cohandlers and closer supervisor involvement in all contacts and registrations;

- the introduction of random drug and alcohol testing, in conjunction with rehabilitation programmes for suitable offenders;

- the introduction of targeted integrity testing;

- greater protection and encouragement of internal informers;

- restructuring of the supervisory arrangements, by rostering of a Duty Officer at each metropolitan local area command 24 hours per day, responsible for all officers on duty, and by assigning sergeants to work in the streets supporting and leading the team members.

3. significant structural and management reform, in which among a raft of changes, the management structure was flattened, police engaged in administrative duties were returned to operations, substantial responsibility and accountability was passed to Local Area Commanders Assessment Centres were established to select officers for promotion, a procedure was introduced for dismissal upon the grounds of loss of Commissioner's confidence, a greater proportion of civilians was introduced into the Service for specialist and management duties, increased emphasis was given to ethics and integrity in recruit and continuing in-service training, and a managerial/remedial model of discipline was introduced.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 Among the benefits hoped for by these initiatives is the acceptance by all Police that they will lead to a better Service, in which each officer has a real responsibility and opportunity to be involved in management, and to behave according to proper standards. This it is believed will lead to greater job satisfaction and to the opening up of new career opportunities.

6.2 A message has gone out to police disenchanted with the notions of integrity, professionalism, work, and zero tolerance for corrupt colleagues and practices, that there is simply no place for them. What must be accepted is the fact that corruption and wilful ineptitude or lack of commitment are incompatible with the special powers and privileges that attach to policing. Those not capable of meeting the necessary standard cannot be hidden in a modern Service. They are a danger to the public and to other police, and they either lower the standards of others, or ferment disaffection.

6.6 It is not possible to predict the future. However, what has been universally recognised is the imperative for change, and the need to break the cycle of corruption, scandal, inquiry and reform, and return to corruption. That cycle has been shared by many Police Services, and New South Wales has not been an exception to it, having undergone scrutiny through several Commissions of Inquiry and investigations.

6.7 The difference in the present case has been the much broader scope of the present Royal Commission, and its adoption of a proactive and current investigative approach, that was very different from the earlier and more traditional Commissions of Inquiry which were entirely reactive, or historic, in their approach.
6.8 While time alone will tell, there is reason for cautious optimism, and hopefully an end to the form of entrenched or systemic corruption which came to be accepted in the past and which has now been exposed.